Russia’s Out-Migration – the “Third Wave”

Putin & Medvedev

In a speech to the Russian Duma (Parliament) on May 10, 2006, then-President Putin called the problem of Russia’s dramatic population decline “the most acute problem of contemporary Russia.”  His successor, Dmitri Medvedev, has expressed similar concerns.  It is hard to avoid the harsh reality that Russia is experiencing a population decline of major proportions.  In fact, Chinese experts who are tracking Russia’s low birth rates have described Russia as “the world’s largest dying nation.”

When the Soviet Union came to an end, the population of the country was 148 million.  Twenty years later, Russia’s population is 143 million and population experts are predicting it will decease to 116 million by the year 2050.  If this occurs and the current spending rates continue, government age-related expenditures will increase from 13% to 25% of Russia’s gross domestic product.

The primary causes of this decline are a high death rate, low birth rate, high rate of abortions, and low level of immigration.  Russia’s death rate of 15 deaths per 1,000 people per year is far higher than the world’s average of just under 9.  The World Health Organization estimates the life expectancy of Russian men at 59 years, while women’s life expectancy is considerably higher at 72 years.  Alcoholism among Russian men is the primary cause of this difference.

In addition, Russia’s birth rate of 10 births per 1,000 people is half the world average.  Russian news services report that there are more abortions than births in Russia, estimating 13 abortions for every 10 live births.

These factors, together with a low level of immigration from former republics of the Soviet Union, are creating a major obstacle in the path of Russia’s future development.  For Kremlin leaders, the three most striking features of these data points are as follows:

·          the overall decline with all of its implications for the loss of a future labor force and recruits for the military services;

·          the worsening of the gender imbalance with women now 54% of the population; and,

·          the relative decline of the ethnic Russian share of the population and the growth of ethnic minority populations, especially Muslims.

The “Third Wave”

The newest related trend, however, appears to be tied to the current political realities in Russia.  Businesses that facilitate the relocation of Russian citizens overseas are reporting record numbers of clients.  One expert said, “It seems that the whole generation of 25- to 45-year old Russians is actively thinking about running away, especially considering the prospect of seeing the same people in power for another 12 years, starting in 2012.”

Analysts are calling this the “third wave” of out-migration.  The first wave came in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union imploded and the country struggled through outbreaks of anarchy during Yeltsin’s administration.  The second came following the 1998 financial crisis and before Yeltsin transferred power to Putin at the end of 1999.

The exact number of Russians who are fleeing the country is hard to pin down, but if the movement of people cannot be precisely measured, the flow of dollars can.  Last year more than $38 billion in capital flight was recorded.

One businessman who works with Russians seeking to move overseas notes that “a third of my clients are doing it for the sake of their children; one-third are simply sick of corruption; and one-third are people who’ve amassed enough wealth and just feel like doing it because they can now afford to.”

Another analyst comments: “The scale of the outflow of the most talented young prospective professionals from Russia is almost beyond belief.”  While the exact numbers are not known, estimates run as high as 40-45,000 per year.  Approximately three million Russians are now ex-pats in the European Union. 

There are no easy answers to this complex of public policy challenges, but people of faith have an opportunity to take a public stand by emphasizing the importance of strong and healthy families and promoting a vibrant pro-life agenda.  These will be the future goals of the Russian-American Institute, goals that Protestants, Orthodox and Catholics can work toward together.

Russia's Defeat of Napoleon

It is not very often that a historian writes a book to counter the “myths” created by a novelist.  Dominic Lieven, a professor of Russian history at the London School of Economics, wrote his 528-page book, Russia Against Napoleon, in order to give “the true story of the campaigns of [Leo Tolstoy’s famous novel,] War and Peace.

Professor Lieven sets the stage by making it clear to his readers that before the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725), most European elites considered the Russians to be “barbarous, alien and unimportant.”  However, following the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great (1762-1796), the power and international status of Russia had grown enormously.  Its series of successful military campaigns had increased the legitimacy of the Romanov dynasty and its autocratic system of government.

The Leadership of Alexander I

Tsar Alexander I

Lieven’s study emphasizes the key role that Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825) played in this dramatic struggle against Napoleon.  On its own, Russia could never have destroyed Napoleon’s empire and the struggle between the armies of these two countries from 1812 to 1814 strained almost every sinew of Russian power to the breaking point.  It was Alexander I’s greatest achievement that he could put together a European grand alliance and hold it together, despite conflicting national priorities of Austrian, Prussian and British leadership.

Alexander I’s faith was a key factor in his leadership role and his religious convictions grew as the pressures of war increased.  He read his Bible every day and underlined passages that he found most relevant.  As he shared with other Russian leaders, his faith sustained him during the difficult challenges of war. 

Historians and contemporary observers have found Alexander I a difficult man to understand.  While he was charming on one level, he also operated in a secretive fashion and was often elusive and distrustful of others.  Perhaps the fact that his father and grandfather were both overthrown and murdered, as well as the previous monarch, Ivan VI, may explain some of his behavior.  Nevertheless, his significance in the victory over Napoleon deserves to he highlighted.

The Crucial Battles at Borodino and Moscow

One of Tolstoy’s myths that Lieven attacks is the elevation of Mikhail Kutuzov, the Supreme Commander of the Russian forces, to a Russian patriotic icon; this myth was embraced by Stalin who described Kutuzov as a military genius far superior to Napoleon.  In Lieven’s judgment, “all this is nonsense.”  Kutuzov struggled with his age and lack of energy and had an aversion to risk.  It was also clear to Lieven that Kutuzov did not share Alexander I’s views on strategy for defeating Napoleon and liberating Europe.

 

The famous battle at Borodino in September 1812 pitted 130,000 French soldiers against 125,000 Russians, many of whom were armed with pikes and axes and had no military training.  Both armies lost between 35,000 and 50,000 men in this struggle, but these losses were especially devastating for Napoleon because of the distance from his source of supplies and re-enforcements.

The battleground then shifted to Moscow and the Russians decided to vacate the city and retreat further into the interior of their vast country.  When Napoleon entered Moscow on September 15 and set up his headquarters in the Kremlin, fires started all over Moscow and the fires burned for six days destroying three-quarters of its buildings.  The causes for these fires has never been determined, but Lieven insists that neither Alexander or Napoleon ordered the city to be burned. 

Napoleon's Retreat

It was Napoleon’s fatal mistake to spend six weeks in Moscow, before he began his retreat.  Napoleon and his supporters later argued that the unusually cold winter was responsible for destroying his army, but Lieven argues that the French army was largely defeated before December when the weather really turned cold.

Not only did the Russian army retreat for hundreds of miles into the interior of the country, but it then marched forward all the way to Paris entering the French capital on Sunday, March 31, 1814.  It is also important to note that Tsar Alexander ordered his generals and allies to preserve the strictest discipline as they marched into France, stressing the importance of cultivating French opinion in their favor.  Russian troops did not pillage, which was a common wartime behavior, but set a remarkable example for their allies.

The Russian Victory

The defeat of Napoleon may be the greatest victory in Russia’s history.  It is the judgment of Lieven that the Russian leaders out-thought Napoleon.   He failed to exploit Russia’s weaknesses, while Alexander I accurately understood the strengths and weaknesses of the French army and used these insights to defeat Napoleon.  It is to Alexander I’s credit that he assembled a grand alliance with Austria and Prussia, getting them to fight side by side against the French.

It is the opinion of Lieven that Tsar Alexander I excelled in his leadership role because he was convinced that Russian and European security depended on each other.  The Russian army was an army of liberation and its soldiers ended an era of constant war and restored European trade and prosperity.  It is Lieven’s hope that this legacy will inspire Russia’s rulers today.

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin

I enjoy reading the memoirs and biographies of government leaders, especially of American Presidents and Secretaries of State.  With my training in European and Russian history, and my special interest in diplomatic history, I looked forward to reading President George W. Bush’s commentary on his eight years in the White House and I was not disappointed.  His first book, Decision Points, is not a typical memoir.  It does not offer a chronological review of his presidential years, but rather focuses on a series of critical decisions he faced in his personal and public life. 

Compared to other presidential memoirs I have read, Bush’s commentaries are not defensive in nature and he is humble enough to say at certain points, I had to make a tough call without all of the information – which, of course, is what happens when you are president!  Anyone who reads this book with an open mind will be struck by the enormous pressures that any president faces every day, pressures that were never anticipated and that take your administration off in a direction you never imagined.

Bush’s first meeting with President Putin was held in a Slovenian palace and his goal was to establish a personal friendship with the Russian leader.  Like many Presidents before him, Bush was convinced that “personal diplomacy” would help these two leaders work through tough issues and give them a basis for future cooperation.  In his book, Bush cites the examples of his father and Abraham Lincoln, who both believed that developing a personal friendship with other world leaders was of critical importance.

At this first meeting, Bush surprised Putin by asking him about a cross given to him by his mother, a cross that Putin later had blessed in Jerusalem.  Putin told Bush how he had hung this cross in his dacha (summer house) and when it later caught fire, how the firefighters were able to find the cross in the wreckage. 

Bush was convinced that this personal exchange relieved the pressure present in their first meeting and, when a reporter later asked Bush if Putin was a man Americans could trust, he said yes.  He then said words that came back to haunt him – “I looked the man in the eye and . . . I was able to get a sense of his soul.”  Reflecting on this experience, Bush now says, “In the years ahead, Putin would give me reasons to revise my opinion” (p. 196).

Three months after this meeting in Slovenia, Putin was the first foreign leaders to call the White House on September 11, a fact that few Americans remember.  The next day, Bush and Putin talked by phone and Putin ended the conversation by saying “Good will triumph over evil.  I want you to know that in this struggle, we will stand together.”

While the first encounters between the two presidents were positive, it did not take long for differences to emerge as these leaders assessed the national interests of their countries from different perspectives.  Putin did not view Saddam Hussein as a threat and joined the French leader, Jacques Chirac, and the German leader, Gerhard Schroeder, in opposition to American pressure on Iraq.

Similar opposition came from President Putin regarding America’s policies toward Iran, NATO expansion, and the war against the Republic of Georgia in August 2008.  Despite hopes for a cooperative relationship with Putin that began in the meeting in Slovenia and the personal exchange about the cross Putin wears, the clashes of interests between Russia and the United States became pronounced over the next eight years.

I was surprised to read that these two presidents met forty times in eight years!  One humorous event took place in the Oval Room of the White House, when Putin entered Bush’s office early in the morning as the sunlight was streaming through the south windows.  As he stepped to the door, he blurted out, “My God . . . This is beautiful!”  Bush commented that this was quite a response for a former KGB agent from the atheist Soviet Union.

While Bush makes it clear that Russia was an opponent of his “freedom agenda,” and this was a “disappointment,” he had the following summary comments about the Russian president: “Putin was a proud man who loved his country.  He wanted Russia to have the stature of a great power again and was driven to expand Russia’s sphere of influence . . . Putin liked power, and the Russian people liked him.”

By the end of Bush’s eight years in the White House, the conflict between Russia and the Republic of Georgia in August 2008 created a hostile relationship between the two countries and the presidents were never able to restore their original friendship.  It was clear to those of us who worked in Russia at that time that this was one of the low points in US-Russian relations.  When the presidents are upset with each other, we find that working with Russian government officials, who follow the lead of their strong president or prime minister, becomes even more difficult that normal. 

While developing close personal relations with presidents and prime ministers of foreign countries has some value, it is never as valuable as the leaders imagine.  Protecting the national interests of their country will always be the bottom line that determines how leaders relate to the heads of other governments.